We exploit quantifier elimination in the global design of combined decision and semi-decision procedures for theories over non-disjoint signatures, thus providing in particular extensions of Nelson-Oppen results.
Introduction and Background
Quantifier elimination has been considered, since the early times of modern symbolic logic, a powerful technique for decision procedures. Even in actual approaches to combination problems (see e.g. [9] ), specific quantifier elimination algorithms are often invoked as specialized reasoners to be integrated within a flexible general setting dealing with multiple theories. This happens, in particular, whenever numerical constraints problems need to be adequately addressed: examples of such specialized reasoners are the Fourier-Motzkin quantifier elimination procedure for linear rational arithmetic or Cooper's quantifier elimination procedure for integer Presburger arithmetic.
In contrast to this local call for quantifier elimination algorithms, we shall address in this paper quantifier elimination as a global design opportunity for integrated provers: we shall show in particular how it can be used in order to extend Nelson-Oppen combination procedure [11] , [13] , [16] to non-disjoint signatures. Detailed proofs of the results presented here, as well as additional information, can be found in [6] .
A signature Σ is a set of functions and predicate symbols (each of them endowed with the corresponding arity). We assume the binary equality predicate symbol = to be always present in Σ. The signature obtained from Σ by the addition of a set of new constants (= 0-ary function symbols) X is denoted by Σ ∪ X or by Σ X . We have the usual notions of Σ-term, (full first order) -formula, -atom, -literal, -clause, -positive clause, etc.: e.g. atoms are just atomic formulas, literals are atoms and their negations, clauses are disjunctions of literals, positive clauses are disjunctions of atoms. Letters φ, ψ, . . . are used for formulas, whereas letters A, B, . . . are used for literals and letters C, D, . . . are used for clauses. Terms, literals and clauses are called ground whenever variables do not appear in them. Formulas without free variables are called sentences. A Σ-theory T is a set of sentences (called the axioms of T ) in the signature Σ; however when we write T ⊆ T for theories, we may mean not just set-theoretic inclusion but the fact that all the axioms for T are logical consequences of the axioms for T .
From the semantic side, we have the standard notion of a Σ-structure A: this is nothing but a support set endowed with an arity-matching interpretation of the predicate and function symbols from Σ. We shall notationally confuse, for the sake of simplicity, a structure with its support set. Truth of a Σ-formula in A is defined in any one of the standard ways (so that truth of a formula is equivalent to truth of its universal closure). A Σ-structure A is a model of a Σ-theory T (in symbols A |= T ) iff all axioms of T are true in A; for models of a Σ-theory T we shall preferably use the letters M, N , . . . to distinguish them from arbitrary Σ-structures. If φ is a formula, T |= φ ('φ is a logical consequence of T ') means that φ is true in any model of T . A Σ-theory T is complete iff for every Σ-sentence φ, either φ or ¬φ is a logical consequence of T ; T is consistent iff it has a model (i.e. iff T |= ⊥).
An embedding between two Σ-structures A and B is any map f : A −→ B among the corresponding support sets satisfying the condition
atoms A (here A is regarded as a Σ A -structure by interpreting each a ∈ A into itself and B is regarded as a Σ A -structure by interpreting each a ∈ A into f (a)). Notice that, as we have identity in the language, an embedding is an injective function (it also must preserve the interpretation of the function symbols and, in case it is just an inclusion, the interpretation of the predicate symbols in the smaller structure must be the restriction of the corresponding interpretation in the bigger structure). In case ( * ) holds for all first order formulas, the embedding is said to be elementary.
The main problems we deal with are word problems, more precisely, given a Σ-theory T : -the word problem for T is that of deciding whether T |= A holds for a Σ-atom A; -the conditional word problem for T is that of deciding whether T |= C holds for a Horn Σ-clause C; -the clausal word problem for T is that of deciding whether T |= C holds for a Σ-clause C; -the elementary word problem for T is that of deciding whether T |= φ holds for a first order Σ-formula φ.
A formula is quantifier-free iff it does not contain quantifiers. A Σ-theory T is said to eliminate quantifiers iff for every formula φ(x) 2 there is a quantifierfree formula φ (x) such that T |= φ(x) ↔ φ (x). There are many well-known theories [4] eliminating quantifiers, we give here some examples which can be of interest for software verification. Example 1.1 Linear integer arithmetic (i.e. the theory of the structure of integer numbers in the signature +, 0, 1, ≤, ≡ n ) eliminates quantifiers; so does rational linear arithmetic (i.e. the theory of rational numbers in the signature +, 0, ≤). Another well-known classical example from Tarski is real arithmetic (i.e. the theory of real numbers in the signature +, 0, ·, 1, ≤). Example 1.2 The theory of acyclic binary lists L [13] , [14] eliminates quantifiers (see [6] ).
The main ingredient of this paper is the well-known notion of a model completion of a theory. There are good chapters on that in all texbooks from Model Theory. We shall recall here just the essential definitions for the only case of universal theories 3 which is the relevant one for the purposes of this paper (readers may consult e.g. [4] , [10] , [18] for further information).
Let T be a universal Σ-theory and let T * ⊇ T a further Σ-theory; we say that T * is a model completion of T iff i) every model of T has an embedding into a model of T * and ii) T * eliminates quantifiers. It can be shown that a model completion T * of a theory T is unique, in case it exists, and moreover that T * has a set of ∀∃-axioms, see [4] . Example 1.3 The theory of an infinite set is the model completion of pure equality theory; the theory of dense total orders without endpoints is the model completion of the theory of total orders. Example 1.4 There are many classical examples from algebra: the theory of algebraically closed fields is the model completion of the theory of intergral domains, the theory of divisible torsion free abelian groups is the model completion of the theory of torsion free abelian groups, etc. is the model completion of the theory of Boolean algebras (for model completions arising in the algebra of logic, see the book [8] ). Example 1.6 An old result in [18] says, in particular, that universal Horn theories T in finite signatures always have a model completion, provided the following two conditions are satisfied: a) finitely generated models of T are all finite; b) amalgamation property holds for models of T . This fact can be used in order to prove the existence of a model completion for theories axiomatizing many interesting discrete structures (like graphs, posets, etc.). Example 1.7 It follows from the quantifier elimination result reported in [6] that the theory L of acyclic binary lists is the model completion of itself. Example 1.8 If a theory T * has elimination of quantifiers, then it is the model completion of the theory T axiomatized by the set of universal sentences which are logical consequences of T , see [4] .
Compatibility
The key ingredient for our combination procedures is the following notion:
Definition 2.1 Let T be a theory in the signature Σ and let T 0 be a universal theory in a subsignature Σ 0 ⊆ Σ. We say that T is T 0 -compatible iff
Condition (iii) can be equivalently given in a slightly different form, by saying that every quantifier-free Σ-formula which is false in a model of T is false also in a model of T ∪ T * 0 . Example 2.2 According to this remark, it is evident that T 0 -compatibility reduces to the standard notion of stable infiniteness (used in the disjoint NelsonOppen combination procedure) in case T 0 is the pure theory of equality: More examples will be supplied in section 4. An interesting feature of T 0 -compatibility is that it is a modular property: Proposition 2.6 Let T 1 be a Σ 1 -theory and let T 2 be a Σ 2 -theory; suppose they are both compatible with respect to a Σ 0 -theory T 0 (where
Combining compatible theories
Let us progressively fix our main data for the whole paper.
Assumption (I). T 1 is a theory in the signature Σ 1 and T 2 is a theory in the signature Σ 2 ; Σ 0 is the signature
Our main aim is that of (semi)deciding the clausal word problem for T 1 ∪ T 2 , given that the corresponding clausal word problems for T 1 and T 2 are (semi)decidable. Equivalently, this amounts to (semi)decide the consistency of
where Γ is a finite set of ground literals in the signature Σ 1 ∪ Σ 2 , expanded with a finite set of new Skolem constants. Γ can be purified: as usual, we can abstract alien subterms and add equations involving further new free constants, in such a way that our problem is reduced to the problem of establishing the consistency of a set of sentences like For trivial reasons, the consistency of (1) cannot follow from the mere separate consistency of T 1 ∪ Γ 1 and of T 2 ∪ Γ 2 . We need some information exchange between a reasoner dealing with T 1 ∪ Γ 1 and a reasoner dealing with
Craig's interpolation theorem for first order logic ensures that the inconsistency of (1) can be detected by the information exchange of a single Σ a 0 -sentence φ such that T 1 ∪ Γ 1 |= φ and T 2 ∪ Γ 2 ∪ {φ} |= ⊥. However, as pointed out in [15] , this observation is not very useful, as φ might be any first-order formula, whereas we would like -at least -φ to be quantifier-free.
Unfortunately, information exchange of quantifier-free Σ a 0 -formulas alone is not sufficient, even for syntactically simple T 1 and T 2 , to establish the inconsistency of (1) (see section 5 below for a counterexample). We so need a further assumption in order to get limited information echange without affecting refutational completeness (this is the relevant assumption we make, the other two being mere notational conventions):
There is a universal Σ 0 -theory T 0 such that both T 1 and T 2 are T 0 -compatible.
A finite list C 1 , . . . , C n of positive ground Σ a 0 -clauses such that for every k = 1, . . . , n, there is i = 1, 2 such that
is called a positive residue chain. We can now formulate our combination results (see [6] for proofs): there is a positive residue chain C 1 , . . . , C n such that C n is the empty clause.
Thus inconsistency can be detected by repeated exchanges of positive ground clauses only; if we allow information exchange consisting on ground quantifier free formulas, a single exchange step is sufficient:
Following [15] , we say that our T i 's are Σ 0 -convex iff whenever it happens
For Σ 0 -convex theories, Theorem 3.1 refines in the following way: 
The locally finite case
We say that a Σ 0 -universal theory T 0 is locally finite iff Σ 0 is finite and for every finite set a of new free constants, there are finitely many Σ a 0 -ground terms t 1 , . . . , t k a such that for every further Σ a 0 -ground term u, we have T 0 |= u = t i (for some i = 1, . . . , k a ).
7
As we are mainly dealing with computational aspects, we consider part of the definition the further request that such t 1 , . . . , t ka 6 Among Σ 0 -convex theories we have the important class of universal Horn theories, see [15] again. Local finiteness is a much weaker requirement than the notion of 'finitary modulo a renaming' introduced in [2] . The reason is because the number k a depends on the cardinality of a; on the contrary a Σ 0 -theory T is said to be finitary modulo a renaming iff there is a finite set of Σ 0 -terms S such that for every Σ 0 -term u there are t ∈ S and a renaming σ such that T |= u = tσ. Consequently, for instance, locally finite theories (like Boolean algebras) in which the number k a grows more than polynomially in the cardinality of a cannot be finitary modulo a renaming.
are effectively computable from a. Examples of locally finite theories are the theory of graphs, of partial orders (more generally, any theory whose signature does not contain function symbols), of commutative idempotent monoids, of Boolean algebras, etc.
In a locally finite theory T 0 , there are restricted finite classes which are representatives, up to T 0 -equivalence, of the whole classes of Σ a 0 -ground literals, clauses, quantifier-free sentences, etc. (they are just the ground literals, clauses, quantifier-free sentences, etc. containing only the above mentioned terms t 1 , . . . , t k a ). As it is evident that we can limit information exchange to ground positive clauses and quantifier-free sentences in that restricted class, both Theorems 3.1, 3.2 yield combined decision procedures for the clausal word problem in T 1 ∪ T 2 in case the above assumptions (I) and (III) are satisfied and in case T 0 is locally finite. In particular, Theorem 3.1 suggest the following extension of the Nelson-Oppen procedure [13] :
Step 1: Negate, skolemize and purify the universal closure of the input clause C thus producing a set Γ 1 of ground Σ Step 2: Using the decision procedures for T 1 , T 2 , check whether T 1 ∪ Γ 1 and
consistent or not (if one of them is not, return 'T 1 ∪ T 2 |= C').
Step 3: If T i ∪Γ i entails some positive ground Σ Step 4: If this step is reached, return 'T 1 ∪ T 2 |= C'. Example 4.1 Let T 1 be rational linear arithmetic and let T 2 be the theory of total orders endowed with a strict monotonic function f . We take as T 0 the theory of total orders (recall that its model completion T * 0 is the theory of dense total orders without endpoints). T 1 is known to be decidable and the clausal word problem for T 2 is decidable too. As
take as M the lexicographic product of M with e.g. the poset of rational numbers). Thus our combination results apply and we obtain the decidability of the clausal word problem for rational linear arithmetic endowed with a strict monotonic function. Example 4.2 A modal algebra is a Boolean algebra B = B, ∩, 1, ∪, 0, (−) endowed with an operator 2 preserving binary meets and the top element. Let now Σ 1 be the signature of Boolean algebras augmented with a unary function symbol 2 1 and let Σ 2 be the signature of Boolean algebras augmented with a unary function symbol 2 2 . T 1 is the equational theory of a variety V 1 of modal algebras and T 2 is the equational theory of another variety V 2 of modal algebras. For i = 1, 2, T i is a universal Horn theory, hence it is Σ i -convex: this means in particular that the solvability of the conditional word problem for T i implies the solvability of the clausal word problem for T i . As every model of T i embeds into a model whose Boolean reduct is atomless, we can conclude that the solvability of the conditional word problem for T 1 and T 2 implies the solvability of the conditional word problem for T 1 ∪T 2 . Also, in case the modal operators 2 1 , 2 2 are both transitive, 8 the solvability of the word problem for T 1 and T 2 implies the solvability of the word problem for T 1 ∪ T 2 .
We underline that the last observation, once read in terms of logics, means exactly fusion decidability for normal extensions of K4. Although this does not entirely cover Wolter's fusion decidability results [19] , it puts some substantial part of them into the appropriate general combination context. For new results (based on a refinement of the combination schema explained in this section) concerning fusion of modal logics sharing a universal modality and nominals, see [7] .
Pure deductions
In this section we give some further suggestions about a possible use of the ideas explained in section 3 within saturation-based theorem proving. We show that whenever T 0 -compatibility holds it is possible to cut in a deduction the inferences which are not pure, still retatining refutational completeness. An inference among (
is pure iff there is i = 1, 2 such that all the clauses C 1 , . . . , C n , C are Σ a iclauses. Similarly, a deduction is pure iff all inferences in it are pure. Usually pure deductions are not able to detect inconsistency of (the skolemization of) sets of sentences like T 1 ∪ Γ 1 ∪ T 2 ∪ Γ 2 , however we shall see that this may happen when the T 0 -compatibility conditions are satisfied.
In order to realize this program, we first need to skolemize the theories T 1 , T 2 , thus passing to theories T We take into consideration here the Superposition Calculus I (see [3] , [12] ). We fix a lexicographic path ordering 9 induced by a total precedence on the symbols of Σ sk 1 ∪ Σ sk 2 ∪ {a}; assuming for simplicity that our signatures are finite, this induces a reduction ordering > which is total on ground terms. We give to symbols in Σ a 0 lower precedence than to symbols in Σ sk 1 \ Σ 0 and in Σ sk 2 \ Σ 0 . This is essential: as a consequence, ground Σ a 0 -clauses will be smaller in the twofold multiset extension of > than all ground clauses containing a proper Σ 1 or Σ 2 -symbol.
Theorem 5.2 In the above assumptions (I)-(IV), the set of sentences
A possible direction for future reseach should try to take advantage from Theorem 5.2 in decision procedures based on Superposition Calculus: in fact for interesting (intrinsecally non locally finite) theories, the Superposition Calculus terminates whenever it has to test satisfiability of finite sets of ground literals [1] .
Before concluding this section, we shall provide an example in which the assumptions of Theorem 5.2 are satisfied and an example in which such assumptions fail.
Example 5.3 Let T 1 , T 2 be both the theory of Boolean algebras; we assume that symbols of the bounded distributivity lattice language (namely ∩, ∪, 0, 1) are shared but that the two complements n 1 , n 2 are not. We want to prove that T 1 ∪ T 2 |= ∀x(n 1 (x) = n 2 (x)). If we take T 0 to be the theory of bounded distributive lattices (i.e. of distributive lattices with 0 and 1), we see that T 1 , T 2 are T 0 -compatible. Skolemization and purification give for instance the two sets of literals Γ 1 = {a = n 1 (c), a = b} and Γ 2 = {b = n 2 (c), a = b}. A pure I-refutation exists: the prover SPASS produces a pure I-refutation consisting on 28 steps. However, the system is not programmed in order to avoid impure inferences, so that, during saturation, it impurely derives also (useless) 'mixed' clauses containing both n 1 and n 2 . One of them, namely the atom b ∩ n 1 (n 2 (a)) = b, is also selected as a given clause. 
Conclusions and related work
In this paper we have extended Nelson-Oppen combination procedure to the case of theories T 1 , T 2 over non-disjoint signatures, in presence of compatibility conditions over a common universal subtheory T 0 . The extension we proposed applies to examples of real interest giving, as shown in section 4, combined decidability in case T 0 is locally finite. Whenever T 0 is not locally finite, our method can be used in order to limit residue exchange (see section 3) or in order to forbid impure inferences in saturation-based theorem proving, thus yielding restrictions on the search space during refutation derivations (see section 5).
It should be noticed that quantifier-elimination plays only an indirect role in the paper: in this sense, the existence of a model completion for a universal theory T 0 guarantees a certain behaviour in combination problems by itself, independently on how quantifier elimination in the model completion is established (this can be established also by semantic non constructive arguments, as largely exemplified in the model-theoretic literature). In principle, the quantifier elimination complexity/decidability has nothing to do with the complexity/decidability of our combination methods, simply because quantifier elimination algorithms do not enter into them. This is crucial, because most quantifier elimination algorithms are subject to heavy complexity lower bounds, which are often structural lower bounds for the decision of the elementary word problem in the corresponding theories [5] .
One may wonder how severe is the crucial condition of T 0 -compatibility used in the paper: let us discuss it for a while. T 0 -compatibility involves two aspects, namely the existence of a model completion T * 0 for T 0 and the embeddability of models of T i into models of T i ∪ T * 0 . As we have shown in the examples, the existence of a model completion seems to be frequent for theories commonly used in software verification. On one side, numeric constraint theories often enjoy this property, in the sense that they eliminate quantifiers (thus being model completions of the theories axiomatized by their respective universal consequences). On the other side, acyclic binary lists might probably be the paradigm of situations arising in theories axiomatizing natural datatypes. Finally, notice that quantifier elimination strictly depends on the choice of the language: every theory trivially has quantifier elimination in an extended language with infinitely many definitional axioms, hence the problem of obtaining quantifier elimination seems to be mostly a problem of choosing a sufficiently rich but still natural and manageable language.
The question concerning embeddability of models of T i into models of T i ∪ T * 0 looks more problematic, in the sense that it can fail in significant situations and, in addition, it does not look to be mechanizable. Further research is necessary on this point, however we underline that there is a relevant case in which the problem disappears. This is the case in which T i is an extension of T * 0 : we have seen an example in section 4 where T i is rational linear arithmetic and T 0 is the theory of linear orders. Another example is the theory of acyclic lists L (which coincides with L * ): any extension of the theory of acyclic lists with significant extra structures matches our requirements and the advantages of our method (limited residue exchange, elimination of impure inferences, etc.) apply to all combinations of theories obtained in this way.
There have been many efforts in the literature trying to extend NelsonOppen combination method to theories sharing function and predicate symbols (different from equality). The starting point of any attempt to generalize Nelson-Oppen procedure to the non-disjoint case should preliminarly answer the following question: what is the specific feature of the stable infiniteness requirement that we want to generalize? In the present paper we answered the question by saying that infinite models are just existentially closed models of the pure theory of equality and based our further investigations on this observation. On the contrary, in other approaches (see e.g. [17] ), it is emphasized that infinite models are just free models of the pure theory of equality with infinitely many generators. This leads to completely different results, because the notion of infinitely generated free and of existentially closed structure are quite divergent and their coincidence for the pure theory of equality must be considered a rather exceptional fact.
Before closing, we would like to remark that the idea (suggested in [15] ) of using interpolation theorems in order to limit residue exchange in partial theory reasoning (whenever the background reasoner has to deal with combined theories) inspired some of the material presented in section 3 above. Notice however the following difference with respect to [15] : there the input theories T 1 , T 2 were assumed to share all functions symbols (alien function symbols belonging to one theory being considered as free Skolem functions for the other), whereas we tried to keep function symbols separated too, as much as possible. This is essential in our context, because otherwise e.g. local finiteness of the common subtheory T 0 would be lost (and decidability of the combined problems presented in section 4 would not be achieved as a consequence).
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